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The Underside of John Locke's Philosophy: The Politics of Distrust 
Abstract 
Locke's writings reveal him as a man 
obsessed with conflict; obsessed first with 
understanding i t  and second with 
controlling it. To understand it Locke 
developed a complex theory of conflict. 
He avers that conflict originates primarily 
due to divergent and false definitions of 
ideas. He devises his political theory with 
an aim to controlling conflict. In this 
scheme politics becomes fundamentally 
the search for and application of 
reasonable, correct definitions of key 
political ideas. The definitions function 
in a twofold manner. First, they facilitate 
trust among members of civil society who 
observe them and thereby lead to the 
effective regulation of conflict. Second, 
all persons who do not share these 
definitions Locke labels enemies of civil 
society. He advises his readers not to 
tolerate such persons - to distrust them. 
This second feature draws our attention 
to a "politics of distrust" parallel to the 
"politics of trust" commonly attributed 
to Locke's political philosophy. Finally, 
because Locke ultimately fails to prove 
the existence of "correct" definitions, 
both his "politics of trust" and "distrust" 
turn out to be grounded in English 
ethnocentricism and Protestant 
theocentricism. 
We do not normally count John Locke 
among the philosophers who treat 
extensively the issue of human conflict. 
Our conventional picture of Locke 
portrays him as man who underscored the 
brighter side of human life. He advocated 
tolerance and g overnment only by 
consent. He assigned a prominent role to 
reason in guiding human affairs and even 
spoke of civil society held together 
through the mutual trust of its citizens. 
This portrait paints far too rosy a 
picture of Locke. It omits a significant 
dimension of his thought which explores 
the darker side of life: sin, irrationality 
and distrust. This darker dimension arises 
out of Locke's burning concern with 
conflict. Indeed, Locke developed a full 
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theory of conflict. Multi-faceted in its 
analysis, the theory examines conflict on 
a variety of levels. On the most superficial 
level, Locke tells us that conflict divides 
primarily into two sorts: material and 
confessional. At the deepest level, he 
teaches that conflict is really all about 
words; it festers only among persons who 
define their terms differently. 
Furthermore, elaborating Locke's 
thoughts on conflict gives us cause to 
recast our understanding of his political 
thought For Locke authors his political 
theory in response to his study of conflict. 
This need not incite us, however, to 
discard our rosy image of Locke 
altogether. For Locke's political 
philosophy basically aspires to liberate 
persons from the mischief of conflict. 
Peace, he claims, can get a foothold only 
in societies whose politics turn on 
tolerance, consensus, reason, and trust. 
But Locke said much more about 
politics. He warned his readers to 
safeguard their commonwealth from 
enemies in order not to squander the peace 
achieved amongst the citizenry. Defense 
involves, first, identifying enemies. For 
Locke, all immoral and irrational persons 
come under the category of enemy. 
Second, it necessitates not tolerating such 
people - distrusting them. Given the 
deserved prominence of John Dunn's 
interpretation of Locke1, it seems sensible 
to refer generally to the brighter aspects 
of Locke's politics as the "politics of 
trust" and to the darker aspects as the 
"politics of distrust." 
This essay seeks to etch out the latter 
by following a design which points us to 
each of the topics mentioned above. As 
each is considered, we will recognize that 
Locke traverses this vast theoretical 
terrain with the aid of two guiding 
assumptions: that there is a law of nature 
whose moral dictates persons can know 
through reason; and that these dictates are 
the same as those enunciated in the 
Christian revelation. After outlining 
Locke's politics of distrust, the essay takes 
up his attempt near the end of his life to 
demonstrate the validity of his guiding 
assumptions. His failure holds grave 
consequences for his political thought. It 
certainly dulls the brighter side; and it 
nearly blackens the darker side. 
Conflict enveloped Locke's world. He 
sensed its threat all around him-at 
Oxford, in England, in Europe, in the 
world at large. Accordingly, Locke's 
concern with conflict runs through all of 
his works. He wrote the Two Tracts on 
Government, for example, as a 
contribution to the fierce battle over 
indifferent things in the 1660s. He laments 
over "what disasters this one issue has 
caused, what tempests, military no less 
than civil, it has provoked"2• The tracts 
also allude to other "hotly disputed" issues 
of the day: "paedobaptism, church 
government, ordination, excommuni­
cation, etc"3• Such issues disturbed Locke 
because they provoke men and incite "the 
many Revolutions which have been seen 
in this Kingdom, in this and former 
Ages"4• In addition to domestic troubles 
like the P uritan Civil War, Stuart 
Restoration and Glorious Revolution, 
Locke felt England endangered by 
external designs, particularly Papist ones.5 
In short, Locke's picture of England was 
marred with the "marks of men striving 
for power and empire over one another"6• 
Vigorous conflict did not confine itself 
to England. Thus, Germany "is notorious 
for civil disasters"7• Conflict raged 
through the whole of Europe like "those 
flames that have made such havoc and 
desolation in Europe and have not been 
quenched but with the blood of so many 
millions"8• Conflict plagued lands far 
beyond the borders of Europe as well. 
Locke tells of the continental Christians' 
struggle with the Tm:ks9 and of the Turks' 
own gory clashes with their eastern 
neighbors10• Both immediate experiences 
and reports from abroad, in other words, 
convinced Locke that " traditions 
vary ... much the world over and men's 
opinions are ... obviously opposed to one 
another and mutually destructive, and that 
not only among different nations but in 
one and the same state"11• 
Human diversity deeply impressed and 
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alarmed Locke. He frequently remarks 
how different peoples manage to develop 
fully different, even opposing beliefs and 
traditions ;  how, for instance, "Our 
deformity is others' beauty, our rudeness 
others' civility"12. And in the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, he 
devotes considerable space to developing 
a theory of the "association of ideas" to 
explain rampant human diversity13. Locke 
harbors no fear for diversity in and of 
itself. Rather, it menaces him only when 
it exists in the absence of a common, 
recognized authority to which men can 
turn to adjudicate their disputes. Without 
such an "Authority to judge between 
them" force becomes the umpire among 
men. That is, diversity degenerates into a 
state of war, that "State of Enmity, Malice, 
Violence, and Mutual Destruction"14. 
Men need not search far for such an 
authority. For Locke maintains that God 
has given mankind the Law of Nature, 
which "lays down what is and what is not 
to be done"15. Moreover, God creates men 
with the capacity to understand the Law 
of Nature through reason. As a result, 
Locke believes the law ' s  fundamental 
precept to be clearly ascertainable to all 
men: "And reason, which is that law, 
teaches all Mankind, who will but consult 
it, that being all equal and independent, 
no one ought to harm another in his Life, 
Health, Liberty, or Possessions"16. Locke 
feels confident that this duty emanates 
from God because Jesus stated it clearly 
in his enunciation of "this general golden 
rule. Matt. 7:12, 'All things whatsoever 
ye would that men should do to you, do 
you even so to them; for this is the law 
and the prophets"'17. 
Moreover, the "Execution of the Law 
of Nature is ... put into every Mans hands, 
whereby every one has a right to punish 
the transgressors of the Law to such a 
Degree, as may hinder its Violation"18• 
Unfortunately, men can use or abuse this 
God-given power of execution. They can 
employ it just as easily to invade and 
oppress their neighbor as to discipline and 
rehabilitate him. Humans thus always live 
in the balance between concord and 
conflict, between the "state of nature" and 
the "state of war." And it is by their own 
decisions and deeds that they come to 
enjoy the one or suffer the other. 
Locke is aware that persons far more 
frequently choose the latter over the 
former. And this seeming enigma sparks 
his interest in understanding the causes 
of conflict. Locke often lays the blame 
for conflict at the doorstep of unethical 
behavior, such as avarice, covetousness, 
dishonesty and pride19. Indeed, as John 
Dunn advances20, Locke ultimately traces 
such wrongdoings to the Fall. Yet, Locke 
often associates immorality with 
irrationality. For instance, troublemakers 
are both "dishonest" and "foolish"21; or 
"moved by avarice and insatiable desire 
of dominion," yet also "confounded"22• 
In Locke's eyes, conflictual persons are 
not merely sinners in the sense of 
transgressors of ethical precepts; they are 
also stupid, or at least intellectually lazy. 
Locke often characterizes them as 
being unaware of the obvious. In the 
Second Treatise, for instance, he claims 
that the distinction between private and 
communal property should be obvious to 
all. There can be "no doubt of Right, no 
room for quarrel," since "there cannot be 
a clearer demonstration of anything''23. Or 
in the Letter Concerning Toleration he 
criticizes the doctrine of Papal infallibility 
for resting on a "frivolous and fallacious 
distinction between the court and the 
church"24. 
The association of immorality with 
irrationality strikes at the core of Locke's 
theory of conflict, indeed, of his entire 
epistemology. In An Essay concerning 
Human Understanding, Locke labors to 
erect the epistemological cornerstone of 
his thoughts on conflict. He aims to 
demonstrate that the irrationality of 
conflict issues, at heart, from opposing 
definitions of ideas; "which is nothing but 
this, that they [persons] are not agreed in 
the signification of those words, nor have 
in their minds the same complex ideas 
which they make them stand for, and so 
all the contests that follow thereupon are 
only about the meaning of a sound''25. The 
Essay reveals Locke as a theorist pro­
foundly interested in the role of language 
in society, especially in the confusion it 
provokes. Here Locke zeros in on conflict 
as the consequence of the "abuse" and 
"imperfection" of language. Here he 
endeavors to disclose the roots of the 
persistent diversity and conflict he sensed 
all around himself. 
In order to follow Locke's manner of 
thinking in the Essay, it helps to begin 
with his definition of knowledge. 
Knowledge consists in "the perception of 
the connexion of and agreement, or 
disagreement and repugnancy of any of 
our ideas"26• Knowledge exists, to take 
simple examples, in perceiving that white 
is white and not black, or that the three 
angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
ones27• Furthermore, it inheres in being 
able to draw the corresponding connection 
between, say, the idea of white and the 
actual white substance snow28; or in 
connecting the idea of horse with an actual 
horse and not, say, with a cassowary29. 
Then truth signifies "nothing but the 
joining or the separating of signs, as the 
Things signified by them do agree or 
disagree one with another"30• Moreover, 
Locke strives to persuade that such 
knowledge can be attained for more 
abstract, moral ideas. Such "moral 
knowledge," he contends, "is capable of 
demonstration, as well as mathematics"31, 
"without leaving any room or any contest 
about it"32. Accordingly, persons can not 
only accurately define a moral idea such 
as justice, but they can with equal 
"exactness" connect or disconnect the idea 
with just or unjust acts in reality33. 
Locke's optimism rests on the assump­
tjon that persons can initially agree on 
definitions. Locke repeatedly contends 
that such consensus is possible among 
human beings, if only they apply them­
selves diligently and reasonably to the 
task34• The premium to be won from such 
an effort easily requites the labor exerted. 
For all disputes "may in good measure 
be remedied by definitions, setting down 
that collection of simple ideas, which 
every term shall stand for; and then using 
the terms steadily and constantly for that 
precise collection"35• 
As he is wont to do, though, Locke 
neutralizes his theoretical optimism with 
realistic pessimism. He tells us persons 
rarely agree on definitions. And he 
devotes the ninth and tenth chapters of 
the Essay's third book (on the "imper­
fection" and "abuse" of words 
respectively) to detailing how persons 
mistake and confuse definitions. Locke 
employs countless examples of 
controversies arising from divergence in 
the meaning of words and ideas. Thus, 
even persons within the same sect, "who 
have a mind to understand one another''36, 
disagree-or at least confuse themselves 
-because they use ideas and definitions 
inconsistently. Hence we find with moral 
ideas, for instance, that "one man's 
complex idea seldom agrees with 
another's, and often differs from his 
own-from that which he had yesterday, 
or will have to-morrow"37• In relations 
between different sects, matters 
deteriorate all the more. Here persons 
often refuse even to try to agree on 
definitions with their adversaries. To the 
contrary, each sect establishes its own 
distinct definitions and ignores those of 
others. Consequently, "there is scarce any 
sect...[which] has not a distinct set of 
terms that others understand not"38• Locke 
cynically concludes that "the 
multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, 
which have so laid waste the intellectual 
world, is owing to nothing more than this 
ill use of words"39• 
Naturally, these reflections concern 
debates among persons who speak the 
same language and live in the same age. 
"But when to this natural difficulty in 
every country, there shall be added 
different countries and remote ages"40, 
controversy stemming from divergent 
meaning becomes practically 
insurmountable. For when persons interact 
without "any standing rule to regulate 
themselves and their notions"41, it "fills 
their discourse with abundance of empty 
unintelligible noise and jargon"42• In short, 
Locke considered as the seed of 
irreconcilable conflict the failure to 
establish and apply lucid and correct 
definitions of ideas (especially moral 
ones). And this failure he called "the 
foundation of the greatest, I had almost 
said of all the errors in the world, if it 
does not reach so far, it is at least the 
most dangerous one, since, so far as it 
obtains, it hinders men from seeing and 
examining"43• 
These reflections exhibit Locke's 
determination not to rest content with a 
simplistic explanation of human conflict. 
He resists attributing discord merely to 
human evil and self-interest. "Interest, 
though it does a great deal in the case, 
yet cannot be thought to work whole 
societies of men to so universal a 
perverseness, as that every one of them 
to a man should knowingly maintain 
falsehood"44• He searches instead for the 
reason why persons fail to see and 
examine things. 
As intimated above, Locke develops 
the theory of the "association of ideas" to 
fill the explanatory void. He recognizes 
that human beings mature intellectually 
in very diverse environments. The 
"truths"-or estabhshed ways of viewing 
the w orld-prominent in persons' 
surroundings normally greatly influence 
persons' perspectives on life. Certain 
constellations of ideas thereby become 
"by education, custom, and the constant 
din of their party, so coupled in their 
minds, that they always appear there 
together; and they can no more separate 
them in their thoughts than if they were 
but one idea, and they operate as if they 
were so"45• Perhaps no other group 
convinces Locke of both the need and 
accuracy of his theory more than the 
Roman Catholics. He feels compelled to 
explain the sincerity with which Roman 
Catholics maintain false doctrines like that 
of transubstantiation or papal infallibility. 
He writes: 
Take an intelligent Romanist that, from 
the first dawning of any notions in his 
understanding, hath had this principle 
constantly inculcated, viz. that he must 
believe as the church (i.e. those of his 
communion) believes, or that the pope 
is infallible, and this he never so much 
as heard questioned, till at forty or fifty 
years old he met with one of other 
principles: how is he prepared easily 
to swallow, not only against all 
probability, but even the clear evidence 
of his senses, the doctrine of 
transubstantiation. This principle has 
such an influence on his mind, that he 
will believe that to be flesh which he 
sees to be bread46• 
Ultimately, it is habit which causes 
conflict. It "is of so great force to set us 
awry in our actions, as well moral as 
natural, passions, reasonings, and notions 
themselves"47• 
Locke's explanation of conflict is 
surprisingly modem. His thoughts border 
on the precipice of twentieth-century 
cynicism and anthropological relativism 
without, however, plunging into their 
abyss of doubt. The Essay frequently 
exhibits Locke as an anachronistic 
phenomenologist of the seventeenth 
century. Ruminations which call forth 
modern notions like "the social 
construction of reality"48 pepper the pages 
of the Essa)l"9• But Locke is no relativist. 
He never neglects to qualify his thoughts 
on human diversity. Thus he writes 
concerning the influence of the association 
of ideas: "This gives sense to jargon, 
demonstration to absurdities, and 
consistency to nonsense," and is that 
which "blinds their understandings, and 
makes them not see the falsehood of what 
they embrace for real truth"50• For Locke, 
3 The Political Chronicle - Spring/Summer 1994 
the Law of Nature still stands majestically 
above the squalor of diversity and 
ignorance in the world. And all persons 
possess the god-given capacity to embrace 
its truths. Not to do so, regardless of the 
obstacles (to which Locke so insightfully 
draws attention), is in the last analysis 
nothing but "madness."51 
Locke abhors conflict because it 
represents human beings in their worst 
state. When persons conflict with one 
another, they essentially fail to think; and 
they thereby let spoil the greatest of God's 
gifts, namely reason. Locke's works 
correspondingly abound with admonitions 
against lax study and examination52• 
"Reason," he admonishes, "must be our 
last judge and guide in everything"53• 
Locke's theology, epistemology and 
anthropology all deeply influence his 
political thought. Locke ultimately sees 
politics as the process by which humans 
make reason their "last judge and guide." 
And this essentially involves constructing 
and enforcing a reasonable language, that 
is, a set or system of terms and definitions 
on which the members of a 
commonwealth can agree. 
The trust that Locke so often refers to 
in his political writings is trust in this 
reasonable political language. Many 
Locke scholars note the central role trust 
plays in his political philosophy54• 
Certainly trust counts as one of the key 
marks which distinguishes Locke's 
political philosophy from that of Hobbes. 
Unlike Hobbes, Locke refuses to accept 
self interest alone as the foundation of 
civil society. A society rooted in self 
interest does not liberate persons from a 
state of war. The state of war merely 
persists with the apparatus of the state 
becoming one more weapon persons try 
to obtain in order to advance their designs 
against adversaries55• In contrast, persons 
who make up a truly peaceful and stable 
society "cannot but be supposed to have 
some Acquaintance and Friendship 
together, and some Trust one in 
another"56• 
The trust in Locke's "politics of trust" 
fundamentally centers on an agreement 
among persons on definitions. Persons 
who politically trust one another 
essentially agree to define and employ key 
political ideas and terms in like manner; 
they speak the same political language. 
Afterall, language marks "the great bond 
that holds society together"57• Building a 
civil-or political�society therefore first 
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necessitates building a correct and reliable 
political language. And once persons 
. interact with the same political language, 
they possess the conceptual wherewithal 
to remedy their disputes.58 This being in 
place, the concrete erection an d 
maintenance of society easily follows. 
This linguistic interpretation of Locke 
does n o t  have to ignore the more 
conventional reading of Locke's politics. 
Persons do enter civil society for "the 
Presavation of their Property"59; they do 
grant their natural executive power to "a 
known and indifferent judge"60; and they 
do go on to organize institutions which 
embody the executive, legislative, and 
federative powers61• But they make all this 
possible only through an initial agreement 
on definitions; they first must define what 
property, judge, and power mean. 
Indeed, Locke's concern with 
agreement on definitions is so strong, that 
it merits reading the Two Treatises as a 
series of definitions. If the work's chapter 
headings give any indication of Locke's 
purpose, they make it difficult to overlook 
his lexicographical aim: "of property," "of 
political or civil society," "of tryanny," 
"of conquest" (to name just a few of the 
political concepts Locke deemed 
important). In the Two Treatises, Locke 
endeavors to compile a political dictionary 
with which his compatriots can adroitly 
tackle their political problems. To express 
my argument slightly differently, Locke 
writes the Two Treatises assuming an 
underlying epistemological and moral 
framework which he was busy 
constructing in the Essa y62• The 
cornerstone of that framework is the 
notion that persons cannot come to trust 
one another so long as they view the world 
through diverging definitions of ideas. 
Needless to say, not just any agreement 
on definitions suffices to produce trust. 
For Locke, they must be the right 
definitions. Persons reach right definitions 
only when they employ their reason to 
formulate the definitions. This type of 
active reasoning about central political 
definitions seems to be what Locke has 
in mind when he claims political society 
originates out of the "positive 
Engagement"63 of its founders. And the 
"express Promise and Compact" which 
characterize genuine members of civil 
society represent, at the deepest level, a 
commitment to recognize the same 
political definitions which other 
reasonable persons recognize. Joining 
civil society, in short, entails swearing an 
oath to other reasonable persons to speak 
their political language. It is no 
coincidence, I suggest, that Locke refers 
to oaths as " the bonds of human 
society"64, exactly the same terminology 
used to describe language. 
These considerations point to the set 
of ideas Locke assumes when he writes 
of government by "consent." Consent 
does not mean just any group of persons 
each of whom individually consents 
voluntarily to membership in a society. 
Locke's consent assumes a group of 
persons who trust one another. They trust 
one another because they reason together. 
They reason together because each person 
individually takes the time to reflect 
seriously on prominent political ideas. 
Consent must be reasoned, not merely 
voluntary, to form a genuine 
commonwealth. Accordingly, Locke 
contends that tacit consent "makes not a 
Man a Member of that Society"65• With 
reason absent from the act of consent trust 
too must be absent. And without trust a 
group of consenting persons at best 
resembles a political society; it cannot, 
however, constitute one66• 
The indispensability of trust in politics 
reveals itself most dramatically at times 
of crisis. Locke is thoroughly convinced 
that only a society bound by trust and 
reason can survive the aggression of 
enemies. Naturally, trust based on reason 
facilitates true conviction which provides 
members of society with the solidarity­
the "inward strength"67, the "sincere 
loyalty"68--effectively to unite against 
invasion and subversion. But Locke offers 
another, more important justification for 
the necessity o f  trust. Only reason 
distinguishes definitively between friend 
and foe; only reason enables persons to 
recognize their enemies. And if persons 
do not know their enemies, solidarity does 
them little good. 
Locke's works reveal a near obsession 
with enemies. His works display him as a 
man terrified by threats to England, 
especially hidden threats. Hidden threats 
stem from those who pretend to be lovers 
of England [that is,  of "king and 
country, ... of peace and the protestant 
interest"69], but who actually conspire 
against it .  Accordingly, Locke is  
concerned "to have the true friends 
distinguished from the secret enemies of 
the government''70• Writing shortly after 
the Glorious Revolution, for instance, 
Locke denounces all persons who defend 
James II' s right to the throne. Such 
Loyalists in effect desire a situation in 
which "Jesuits must goveme and France 
be our master"71• In the Letter concerning 
Toleratio n, Locke admonishes the 
magistrate not to tolerate similar enemies. 
To do so "means the magistrate would 
give way to the settling of a foreign 
jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer 
his own people to be listed, as it were, 
for soldiers against his own 
government"72• We thus find Locke 
frequently striving to draw his reader's 
attention to enemies within the ranks who 
will subvert society if not properly 
controlled. 
These secret enemies wage their battles 
with words rather than with swords. For 
Locke, this makes them most dangerous. 
They do "Mischief to Prince and People 
(by) the Propogating wrong Notions 
conce rning Government"73• Such 
doctrines spread "doubts or distrusts 
amongst us" and cause "disorder and 
confusion "74• They facilitate "the 
Weakness to be deceived with 
Contradictions dressed up in a Popular 
Stile, and well turned Periods"75• And this 
leads Englishmen actually to "let in a 
foreigne force, enemy to our religion and 
nation"76• 
Locke combats these soldiers of words 
with words-with the words of reason. 
Reasonable persons must employ their 
reason like a searchlight to ferret out 
subversive zealots and enthusiasts. Since 
reasoning hangs so closely together with 
correct definition and application of terms 
and concepts, persons best disclose their 
enemies by examining the political 
definitions espoused by the politically 
active and influential in society. When 
the latters' ideas appear absurd, the secret 
enemies of the government have been 
spotted. 
No work better exemplifies Locke's 
hunt for enemies than the Two Treatises. 
Locke obviously deemed Sir Robert 
Filmer (a leading apologist of absolute 
monarchy) a secret enemy of the 
government Moreover, Locke must have 
felt that the persons who propogated the 
doctrines embodied in Filmer's 
Patriarcha were spreading doubt and 
distrust throughout the land. For Locke 
sets out in the Two Treatises primarily to 
prove the unreasonableness of Filmer's 
doctrine; and for Locke, this means a 
thorough scrutiny of Filmer's language. 
Thus, Locke declares his intention to 
demonstrate that 
if any one wil l  be at the Pains 
himself...to strip Sir Robert's Discourses 
of the Flourish of doubtful Expressions, 
and endeavor to reduce his Words to 
direct, positive, intelligible Propositions, 
and then comp are them one with 
another, he will quickly be s atisfied 
there was never so much glib Nonsense 
put together in well sounding English77• 
This was, of course, the task of the 
First Treatise. fu the Second Treatise, 
Locke goes on, as suggested above, to 
present and justify the correct political 
definitions. He must have concluded that 
with the wrong and right definitions 
contrasted so starkly next to one another 
his readers could easily see Filmer for 
the enemy of the land Locke took him to 
be. Moreover, by fostering reasoned 
examination of political ideas Locke must 
have hoped to contribute to the 
establishment of trust in English politics 
and to the future stability of the land. 
Locke's hopes were answered. By the 
time he wrote the preface to the Two 
Treatises in 1689, he could applaud his 
compatriots for discovering and repelling 
their enemies. "The King, and Body of 
the Nation, have since so thoroughly 
confuted his [Filmer's] Hypothesis, that I 
suppose, no body hereafter will have ... 
the Confidence to appear against our 
common safety"78• However, the fact that 
Locke published the Two Treatises after 
the Glorious Revolution suggests he was 
not as confident as this passage conveys. 
He admits so much when he writes: "For 
I should not have Writ against Sir 
Robert ... were there not Men amongst us, 
who, by crying up his Books, and 
espousing his Doctrine, save me from this 
Reproach of Writing against a dead 
Adversary"79• Locke continued to be 
worried about secret enemies; so worried, 
that in both his two and only manuscripts 
concerning the Glorious Revolution he 
called for public renunciation of the 
political doctrines he judged false80• 
Locke's search for enemies surfaces 
in other works as well. In the Letter 
concerning Toleration, Locke does not 
scrutinize a specific "false" doctrine. 
Nevertheless, he does conduct the search 
by means of a definition. His chief 
purpose is "to distinguish exactly the 
business of civil government from that of 
religion." As the letter reveals, this 
basically entails defining the two concepts 
carefully. In his usual manner, Locke 
professes that correctly defining the two 
concepts lies at the heart of eliminating 
the conflict aroused in these matters. "If 
this not be done, there can be no end put 
to the controversies that will be always 
arising between those that have, or at least 
pretend to have, on the one side, a 
concernment for the interest of men's 
souls, and, on the other side, a care of the 
commonwealth"81• But once Locke lays 
out his "correct'' definitions of the two, 
he uses them to point the finger at enemies 
of the commonwealth. He counsels the 
reader not to tolerate atheists and Roman 
Catholics; atheists because they do not 
even acknowledge religion and therefore 
surely cannot see the distinction between 
church and civil government; Catholics 
because they make the two terms 
synonymous and thereby "have ... mixed 
together and confounded two things that 
are in themselves most different, the 
church and the commonwealth"82• Since 
the two groups do not share Locke's 
reasonable definitions, he labels them 
unreasonable and therefore hostile. 
It becomes clear, then, how much 
Locke relies on reasonable language and 
linguistic scrutiny to direct attention to 
the adversaries of civil society. Examining 
their definitions carefully oonstitutes an 
effective way not only to nip conflict in 
the bud, but also to protect the 
commonwealth from potential subversion. 
For all his talk of trust, in other words, 
Locke spent much of his time distrusting 
others. 
Closer analysis demonstrates that 
Locke developed a complete "politics of 
distrust" parallel to his "politics of trust." 
And as is bis custom, Locke devises the 
politics of distrust through a series of 
definitions. In the Two Treatises, Locke 
supplies his reader with several definitions 
needed to determine enemies. These 
primarily include "the state of war," 
"despotical power," "tyranny," 
"usurpation," and "the dissolution of 
government." The first instructs in a most 
general way who represents an enemy: 
"And therefore declaring by Word or 
Action, not a passionate and hasty, but a 
sedate settled Design, upon another Mans 
Life, puts him in a State of War with him 
against whom he has declared such an 
intention"83• The other definitions more 
specifically define likely acts which 
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enemies commit 
But Locke also warns his readers not 
to wait for an actual commission. Waiting 
leads to the situation in which it is "too 
late"84 to expel the enemy. For this reason 
Locke defines enemy hostility as "Word 
or Action." He thereby rationalizes his 
own method of detecting adversaries by 
the analysis of their words. It is Locke's 
epistemology which enables him to make 
this (in my eyes giant) step which equates 
words and actions. fu the Essay, Locke 
convinces himself of the power of words. 
As the above discussion exhibited, he 
concludes that conflict stems originally 
from false definitions. Furthermore, his 
theory of the association of ideas lets him 
assume that people's words determine 
their actions. Only with such a theory 
could Locke write passages of the 
following sort which condemn persons 
completely through supposition: "For I 
have reason to conclude, that he who 
would get me into his Power without my 
consent, would use me as he pleased, 
when he had got me there, and destroy 
me too when he had a fancy to it...and 
reason bids me look on him, as an Enemy 
to my Preservation, who wouUl take away 
that freedom, which is the Fence to it"85• 
Locke's use of the subjunctive tense here 
makes it clear that an enemy in word will 
soon become an enemy in deed. In 
Locke's eyes, what reason for waiting for 
the deed remains outside of foolishness 
or insolence? 
But once persons discover their 
enemies, they must decide what to do with 
them. Locke tenders essentially four 
definitions to guide this treatment "man," 
"beast," "slavery," and "conquest." The 
first two do not enjoy their own chapter 
heading but are plainly handled in 
conjunction with Locke's discussion of 
the state of nature. Put succinctly, man 
reasons; beasts do not. More importantly, 
those persons who fail to reason 
degenerate into beasts, indeed, into the 
worst kind-those "noxious Creature(s)," 
those "wild Savage Beasts with whom 
Men can have no Society nor Security"86• 
Furthermore, their bestiality prescribes 
their treatment. "For having quitted 
Reason ... be becomes liable to be 
destroyed by him be uses force against, 
as any savage ravenous Beast, that is 
dangerous to his being"87• Unreasonable 
persons render themselves liable to 
conquest. Conquering them practically 
corresponds to enslaving them; for 
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"Slavery .. .is nothing else, but the State of 
Wa r continued, between a lawful 
Conquerour, and a Captive"88• 
Locke's passage on conquest also 
provides another example of his belief in 
the power of words. He stipulates that 
the conqueror possesses the right of 
dominion only over those who use force 
against civil society89• Since he earlier 
argued that word or action can initiate 
war, he seems to place words under the 
rubric of force. It seems Locke agrees­
at least on some occasions-that the pen 
is mightier than the sword. Perhaps it was 
Locke's awareness of the potency of 
ideology-to use a contemporary 
notion-which made him fear potential 
conflict all around him. Whatever the 
cause, this fear stimulated him to value 
distrust as much as trust in politics. 
Both the "politics of trust" and 
"distrust" rely on the demonstrability of 
reason. They depend upon the actual 
existence of 1) reasonable linguists and 
2) correct political and moral definitions. 
Moreover, if Locke uses the Law of 
Nature and the definitions it implies to 
make the case for the possibility of a civil 
society as well as to distinguish between 
the members and non-members of society, 
he must prove the existence of such a 
law. Although the majority of his works 
takes the law as given90, Locke 
acknowledged his philosophical 
o bligation to prove its reality. "To
establish morality ... upon its proper basis," 
Locke writes, we must "show ... that there 
are certain rules certain dictates which it 
is his [God's] will all men should conform 
their actions to, and that this will of his is 
sufficiently promulgated and made known 
to all mankind"91• This task Locke 
undertakes in the Essay, whose purpose 
is " t o  take a s urvey of our o w n  
understandings, examine our own powers, 
and to see to what things they were 
adapted"92• 
They are not adapted to demonstrating 
morality. Locke talks a great deal of a 
kind of mathematics of morality whereby 
"moral knowledge may be brought to so 
great clearness and certainty"93• Like 
mathematics, morality can possess a set 
of definite principles and definitions 
which guide the moralist unequivocally 
through the queries of his field. Locke 
scholars readily agree, however, that 
Locke failed to supply these building 
blocks of an indisputable morality despite 
his claims of their existence94• Locke 
confesses so much himself by the end of 
the last edition of the Essay and in his 
final work, The Reasonableness of 
Christianity. In the latter, he writes: "It is 
plain, in fact, that human reason, 
unassisted failed men in its great and 
proper business of morality. It never from 
unquestionable principles, by clear 
deductions, made out an entire body of 
the 'law of nature"'95• 
In The Reasonableness of Christianity, 
Locke searches for that needed assistance 
in the Christian revelation. All his life he 
had assumed the identity of the dictates 
of reason and the decrees of the Christian 
revelation96• Therefore, when the light of 
reason shone not as brightly as Locke 
banked on, he turned to the example of 
Jesus Christ to teach men how to live. 
For Christ's message encompasses the 
Law of Nature. "There is not, I think any 
of the duties of morality which he has 
not, somewhere or other, by himself and 
his apostles, inculcated over and over 
again to his followers in express terms"97• 
Accordingly, Locke devotes his efforts in 
this work to deciphering Christ's lessons 
as delivered in the Scriptures for all to 
acknowledge and follow. 
Locke's venture, however, cannot pass 
as a demonstration of the Law of Nature. 
The Reasonableness of Christianity 
constitutes at best an impressively erudite 
hermeneutic exegesis-but hardly an 
admissible philosophical proof-of the 
law established in Scripture. Locke 
creates, in effect, a loosely conceived 
Protestant theocentric system of morality. 
Granting Locke's example cogency as the 
embodiment of a Law of Nature demands 
a Pascalian leap of faith. For faith "is the 
assent to any proposition, not thus made 
out by the deductions of reason''98. Despite 
this reliance on faith, Locke refuses to let 
reason fall by the wayside altogether. We 
employ reason, he contends, to satisfy 
ourselves that a given testimony actually 
emanates from God: "whether it be a 
divine revelation or no, reason must 
judge"99• More importantly, 
no proposition can be received for 
divine revelation ... if it be contradictory 
to our clear intuitive knowledge. 
Because this would be to subvert the 
principles and foundations of all 
knowledge, evidence, and assent 
whatsoever; and there would be left no 
difference between truth and falsehood, 
no measures of credible and incredible 
in the world, if doubtful propositions 
shall take place before self-evident; and 
what we certainly know give way to 
what we may possibly be mistaken in100. 
Yet, Locke's own intuition should have 
caused him to doubt his assertions in The 
Reasonableness of Christianity. His 
studious analysis of peoples of different 
cultures and of the nature of the conflict 
between them suggests that it is in fact 
not so clear to everyone that the 
Scriptures' prescriptions stem directly 
from God. And even those who would 
grant the divinity of Scripture hardly see 
eye to eye on its interpretation101• Locke 
not only took part in such scriptural 
debates, he perspicaciously explained 
their intensity and longevity. Indeed, his 
very own analysis in the Essay goes far 
to explain why in The Reasonableness of 
Christianity he himself let what he 
certainly knew give way to what he may 
possibly have been mistaken in. For in 
embracing the Christian revelation as real 
truth, Locke fell under the spell of his 
education, custom, and constant din of 
his party. "Real truth" became 
synonymous with being English and being 
Protestant. 
The epistemological shift (failure) 
implied· in The Reasonableness of 
Christianity casts considerably different 
light on Locke's politics. Unfortunately, 
Locke never returned to his political 
thought to edit it, or at least to illumine 
the consequences his final work held for 
his politics. However, it behooves heirs 
of Locke's thought to do so. First, Locke's 
"politics of trust" transforms into a trust, 
not among reasonable persons, but among 
English P rotestants. The political 
definitions they agree to observe result 
not from reasonable examination, but 
from cultural self-confidence and pride. 
Cultural partiality becomes the bond that 
holds society together. Reasonable 
definitions play no significant role. 
Second, and more importantly, Locke's 
"politics of distrust" turns into the distrust 
of all those who do not share his view. 
Our discussion above reveals that Locke 
already distrusted these people long 
before he wrote The Reasonableness of 
Christianity. But before this work he 
founded his suspicion on their irrationality 
per se and not on their cultural heritage. 
In supplanting the universal definitions 
he unsuccessfully sought in the Essay with 
his own Protestant definitions derived 
from the Scriptures in The 
Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke 
effectively labels all non-English and non­
Protestants enemies of civil (English) 
society. This, in tum, condemns them to 
bestiality, slavery and conquest - to 
something like an English, Protestant 
Inquisition. 
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